Abstract: There is a general presumption that competition is a good thing. In this paper we show that competition in the insurance markets can be bad when there is adverse selection. Using the dual theory of choice under risk, we are able to fully characterize both the competitive and the monopoly market outcomes. When there are two types of risk, the monopoly dominates competition if and only if competition leads to market unravelling. When there are a continuum of types the e¢ ciency of competition is less trivial. In e¤ect monopoly is shown to provide better insurance but at the cost of driving out some agents from the market. Performing simulation for di¤erent distributions of risk, we …nd that monopoly in general performs (much) better than competition in terms of the realization of the gains from trade across all traders in equilibrium. The reason is that the monopolist can exploit its market power to relax the incentive constraints.
Introduction
In this paper we address the critical question: how and how well do competition on the markets handle the fundamental problems of information. With imperfect information, market actions or choices convey information and we know from earlier work (e.g. Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976 ) that existence problems can arise in competitive markets because the slight change in the action of the informed side of the market discretely changes beliefs of the other side of the market. While information asymmetries inevitably arise, the extent to which they do so and their consequences on the realization of the gains from trade depend on the how the market is structured. This raises the fundamental question of the interplay between two forms of market imperfections: imperfect information and imperfect competition. There is no particular reason why competition should be better in the presence of imperfect information. The simplest way by which this would not be true is when the …rm could exploit its market power to relax the incentive constraints.
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the e¢ ciency of competition on the insurance market in the presence of adverse selection. Using the benchmark model of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) , we contrast the competitive equilibrium outcome with the monopoly equilibrium outcome à la Stiglitz (1977) and we compare their relative e¢ ciency. Following Rustichini et al (1994) , the (expected) e¢ ciency of an equilibrium is the fraction whose numerator is the expected gains from trade across all traders in the equilibrium and whose denominator is the expected gains from trade across all traders with full information. Using this criterion we compare the monopoly outcome with one seller of insurance contracts and many potential buyers with di¤erent risks against the competitive outcome imposing zero pro…t on each contract that might be o¤ered in equilibrium. To deal with the possible non-existence of a competitive equilibrium à la Rothschild Stiglitz with a continuum of types (Riley, 2001 ) we refer to the concept of reactive equilibrium developed by Riley (1979) and Engers and Fernandez (1987) for which the Pareto-dominant full separating zero-pro…t outcome is the unique reactive equilibrium.
It is well known that models describing the e¤ect of asymmetric information on the market performance can be distinguished according to how they model the market mechanism and how they de…ne a market outcome. The conclusions then turn out to be very sensitive to minor modelling changes. To handle this di¢ culty we choose not to model a particular market mechanism but rather take the fundamental feature of all market mechanisms, voluntary participation in trade and the incentive constraints, and apply the revelation principle to study the relative e¢ ciency of competition.
Our paper continues a line of research begun by Stiglitz (1977) , who analyzed monopoly insurance mostly with two types of agent with expected utility, and compared the equilibrium outcome with the (twotype) competitive outcome. However his comparison analysis did not come out neatly when dealing with a continuum of types. Dalhby (1987) studies the same issue in a two-type insurance model with expected utility, but again without using the expected e¢ ciency criterion to compare competition and monopoly. We perform this analysis in a non-expected utility approach and with a continuum of risks. It turns out that by using the dual theory approach of Yaari (1987) , we are able to provide a clearcut comparison between monopoly and competition.
The dual theory has the property that utility is linear in income, and risk aversion is expressed entirely by a transformation of probabilities in which bad outcomes are given relatively higher weights and good outcomes are given relatively lower weights. In our simple two-state model the probability of bad outcome is weighted up by a loading factor. As we shall see this formulation of risk aversion without diminishing marginal utility allows the derivation of a rich set of insights. Although most of the classical results in insurance theory appear to be robust to such departures from the expected utility model, one important implication to the demand of insurance deserves to be emphasized and will play a major role in the rest of the analysis: under the dual theory, a risk averse individual has constant marginal willingness to pay for insurance whereas under expected utility a risk averse individual has decreasing marginal willingness to pay. 1 A related key di¤erence is about the order of risk aversion. 2 When risk aversion is of order 1 as in the DT, it could be optimal for a policyholder to buy full insurance even above the fair price. This is because he derives positive bene…ts from the last dollar of coverage. By contrast under EU, risk aversion is of the second order and the bene…t from the last dollar of coverage is zero. Therefore nobody would …nd pro…table to buy complete insurance slightly above fair price in the EU model eventhough this is common practice. Recently some works by Jeleva and Villeneuve (2004) and Chassagnon and Villeneuve (2005) deal with a seemingly related argument: the insurance market under adverse selection with subjective risk perception. In these works, risk aversion is still expressed by the decreasing 1 Fortunately, as shown in Doherty and Eeckhoudt (1995) and Machina (1989 Machina ( , 1995 many of the implications of expected utility theory for the optimal insurance design carry over to the non-expected utility approach. 2 For the de…nition of the order of risk aversion, see Segal and Spivak (1990) . An excellent survey of the various de…nitions of risk aversion is provided in Cohen (1995) . 3 See Mossin (1968) .
marginal utility of wealth, but probabilities are modi…ed in the expected utility function according to a subjective perception. In the monopolist framework with two types a rich set of equilibrium allocation is de…ned, depending on the relative perception of the risk of the two types. 4 Among these results, a pooling equilibrium is a possible outcome, just as in our paper, essentially for the same reason: the order of risk aversion. The second best allocation with two types di¤ers from our results (see Section 3). 5 Indeed, by allowing for overinsurance and restricting the analysis to utility function with smooth indi¤erence curves ("no kink" at full coverage) they show that there is no positive pro…ts in the second best allocation, and that there is no pooling contract with full coverage in the second best. These conclusions rest heavily on the fact that the no-kink assumption implies that "pessimistic types", that have a perception of the risk higher than reality, prefer risky outcomes (with over-insurance) to sure outcome (with full insurance). Moreover this approach is not appropriate for our welfare analysis. The fact that agents make mistake in their perception of the risk makes the welfare analysis of competition potentially misleading (i.e. should we take into account such misperception of risk when comparing competitive outcome versus the monopoly outcome?).
It would be absurd to suggest that the dual theory provides a better model than the expected utility. The latter has obvious appeal and has provided so many useful results in insurance theory. Nonetheless, we feel there is some gain from studying the properties of our simple non-expected utility model, even if only to derive some clear insights on the e¢ ciency of competition in the presence of adverse selection. Indeed another distinctive property of insurance under DT is that the demand of insurance cannot decrease with wealth. In contrast the EU model makes the comparison between competition and monopoly di¢ cult since by charging a higher premium (relative to competition) for a given coverage the monopoly increases the marginal willingness to pay for insurance. 6 As a result Dahlby (1987) showed that equilibrium coverage can be either higher or lower in a monopoly.
The key …nding is that the monopoly outcome, in general, is more e¢ -cient than the competitive outcome (according to our expected e¢ ciency criterion). The reason why monopoly performs better than competition is that the monopolists can exploit its market power to o¤er contracts that better satisfy the incentive constraints. More precisely, the monopo- 4 Jeleva and Villeneuve (2004). 5 Chassagnon and Villeneuve (2005). 6 Dahlby (1987) shows that the marginal willingness to pay for insurance is a decreasing function of wealth when the absolute risk aversion is decreasing.
list can o¤er contracts with implicit transfers across agent types that can relax the incentive constraints and implement a larger set of allocations. This is one of many examples of the interplay between market imperfections (see Stiglitz 1975 and Ja¤ee and Stiglitz 1990). The economy, in e¤ect has to trade o¤ between two di¤erent imperfections: imperfections of information or imperfections of competition, with no particular reason that these imperfections will be balanced optimally.
Our main …nding about the ine¢ ciency of competition has to be contrasted with recent work on the (asymptotic) e¢ ciency of competition based on the idea that asymmetry in agent's information is relatively unimportant in a large economy (obtained by a replication process) because any single agent has only a small amount of information not known by the other agents. 7 This is the notion of informational smallness. As Gul and Postlewaite noted, this result holds in private value information problems in which agents have private information that is of direct relevance only to themselves (i.e. the agents' utility functions depend only on their own type). This is obviously not the case for the insurance problem (and for the adverse selection problem in general). Indeed in our insurance problem with a continuum of types it might seem that each agent is informationally small and yet the market outcome is very far from the full information outcome. The reason is that each agent remains informationally large in this context. Muthoo and Mutuswami (2005) obtain a similar result for the "lemons"markets. They show that e¢ ciency is decreasing in the degree of market competition (measured by the number of sellers, …xing the number of buyers). The driving force for their result is di¤erent however. They show that …rst-best surplus is increasing in the number of sellers (of either high or low quality good) but the realized market surplus is unchanged. The reason is that, in the …rst-best, the probability of trade with a high quality seller increases with the number of sellers. In contrast the incentive constraints imply that the probability with which a high-quality seller will trade cannot be greater than the probability with which a low quality seller will trade, which is independent of the number of sellers.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model. Section 3 contains the full information equilibrium and e¢ ciency analysis of competitive and monopoly markets in the simple two-type case. In Section 4 the analysis is extended to the continuum of types and simulation results are provided about the expected e¢ ciency of competitive and monopoly markets. Section 5 concludes.
The model
There are two possible states of the world: the "no accident" state and the "accident"state. Individuals di¤er only by their probability of accident, in which case they face a (…xed) damage d = 1. There is no moral hazard since individuals cannot a¤ect their probability of accident which is …xed. There is a continuum of risk in the economy distributed according to a cumulative probability function F ( ) with density f ( ) > 0 on a closed and compact interval 2 ; (with 0 < < 1). Adverse selection is introduced by assuming that individual risk is private information, while the distribution of risks is common knowledge. We model individuals'risk preferences using Yaari (1987) 's dual theory (DT). We …rst give a general description of this approach before applying it to our model. Let wealth X be a random variable distributed over [x; x] according to the distribution function (x). Yaari's representation of preferences is dual to the expected utility theory (EU) in the sense that it is linear in wealth but non linear in probabilities. Probabilities are transformed by a function de…ned on the distribution function (x). 8 More precisely, DT preferences over X are given by
where (0) = 0; (1) = 1 and 0 (:) > 0. 0 (:) are non-negative weights adding up to one. Attitude towards risk is conveyed entirely by the shape of (:). Risk aversion is characterized by the concavity of (:), i.e. 00 (:) < 0. In this case, bad outcomes (with low (X)) receive higher weights than good outcomes (with high (X)). In other words, V (X) is the certainty-equivalent of X computed as a weighted average of outcomes in which bad outcomes are given high weight while good outcomes are given low weight. Since V (X) is linear in wealth, this approach separates attitude towards risk from attitude towards wealth.
We now apply DT to our simple two-state setting. For an individual with wealth w facing a damage d = 1 with probability , insurance contract with premium > 0 and coverage rate 2 [0; 1] yields the random variable X = (w (1 ); ; w ; 1 ). We thus de…ne the utility associated to this insurance contract as
where risk aversion is represented by ( ) > (and 1 ( ) < 1 ). 9 In this paper, we further assume that ( ) = (1 + ) , with 0 1 (the upper bound guaranteeing that ( ) 1 8 ). Making independent of w accords with our desire to disentangle risk aversion from income and will greatly simplify the analysis. Using this formulation, type-utility function from insurance contract ( ; ) is
where the utility loss from the residual risk (1 ) is in ‡ated by the markup factor 1 + . Now, comparing the utility with insurance against the utility without insurance we can de…ne the reservation premium for each type. This is the premium ~ ( ) that solves
so that the reservation premium of type for coverage is:
Moreover the surplus of the agent is de…ned as the di¤erence between the reservation price and the price e¤ectively paid:
Assuming > 0, with free participation, those agents receiving < 0 will drop out of the market.
It is straightforward to see that the functions V and S have the Single-Crossing property in the contract space-( ; ), because the marginal value of coverage is increasing in . This property implies the Increasing Di¤erence (ID) property.
A function f : ! R, where , R, has Increasing Di¤er-ences if the di¤erence f ( 00 ; ) f ( 0 ; ) is increasing in 2 8 00 ; 0 2 such that 00 > 0 . 9 Note that in our model with a discrete random variable, risk aversion translates into the transformation of the discrete density function ( ) > rather than the concave transformation of the distribution function 00 ( ) < 0 as for continuous random variable. In both cases risk aversion implies that bad outcomes are given higher weight and good outcomes lower weight.
The ID property of V and S is due to the fact that these functions are continuously di¤erentiable on a closed interval 2 [0; 1] with the cross-derivatives
As a prelude to our analysis we will …rst study the two-type case. This will provide the preliminary insights on the e¢ ciency of competition in the insurance market.
The two-type case
There are two types of risk. A proportion p has risk and a proportion (1 p) has risk . We derive …rst, as a benchmark, the …rst-best allocations. Then we compare this outcome with the competitive and monopoly insurance outcomes.
First-best
The …rst best solution, when there is no problem of information about the type of the agent, is easily derived by maximizing the expected surplus across all traders subject to the participation constraints. The optimization programme is:
(1 p) S ; ; + pS ( ( ) ; ( ) ; ) + subject to
Substituting for the surplus functions and the pro…t functions, the programme reduces to:
The solution is:
All the agents are provided with full insurance and the premium charged de…nes the way the surplus is split among …rms and agents. The …rms get all the surplus when the premia are set equal to the reservation prices ( ) = (1 + ) and = (1 + ) , while the agents get all the surplus when the premia are set equal to the fair prices ( ) = and = . Total surplus in the …rst-best is then
Second-best
The set of second-best allocation (also called constrained Pareto optimum) is characterized by the set of allocations satisfying the Incentive Compatibility constraints together with the participation constraints. 10 It solves the following programme:
The participation constraint of high type (6) is implied by (5) and (8) and can be disregarded. Also following standard argument of no-distortionat-the-top, the surplus is maximized for = 1. The incentive constraint of the low type (7) is typically not binding. Using these facts the optimization programme reduces to
The solution to this optimization problem is given in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 There exists p < 1 such that, for p < p the second-best outcome is a separating contract with
for p p the second-best outcome is a pooling contract with
Proof. See Appendix. Figure 1 depicts the …rst-best and second-best expected surplus as a function of p, no matter how the surplus is split between agents and …rms. The Second Best coincides with the First Best when the proportion of low risks is su¢ ciently high to sustain a pooling outcome.
Monopoly
The monopoly maximizes pro…t subject to the IC and IR constraints of the two types: (5) , (6), (7) and (8) . Standard result in monopolist screening problem implies that the Individual Rationality constraint of the low type, (5) , and the Incentive Compatibility constraint of the high type, (8) , are binding. So the IC for the low type (7) is not binding. Moreover, as in the second-best outcome, the monopoly pro…t is maximized for = 1. The monopoly outcome is the following.
Proposition 2 In a monopoly insurance market, there exists p < 1 (with p > p ) such that, for p p the monopoly outcome is a pooling contract with
Proof. see Appendix
The interpretation of the threshold p is clear. Consider increasing the insurance coverage o¤ered to the low type by ( ). The net revenue from this type rises by an amount ( ). This reduces revenue from the high-type to maintain the schedule incentive compatible. Since the indi¤erence curves are linear, this revenue loss is just equal to the di¤erence in the slopes of the indi¤erence curves of the two types times the change in the coverage rate: (1 + ) ( ). Weighting these costs and bene…ts of increasing ( ) by the proportion of each type, we have that it is (weakly) pro…table if and only if p
(
The existence of a pooling monopoly equilibrium is in sharp contrast to the expected utility result. Indeed, Stiglitz (1977) showed that pooling equilibria are always dominated by separating equilibria where the lowrisk individuals obtain partial insurance and do not obtain any surplus. The reason is that expected utility implies that the marginal value of insurance is equal to the fair price at the full coverage point (i.e., SecondOrder risk aversion). So, starting from a pooling equilibrium with full coverage, a slight reduction in the coverage with o¤setting reduction in premium to maintain the low type indi¤erent, does not a¤ect the pro…t earned on that type, but it relaxes the incentive constraint on the high risk and allows the monopolist to extract more of the surplus from the high risk. With non-expected utility this argument does not apply because we have a First Order risk aversion. This implies that the marginal value of insurance is greater than the fair price at the full coverage point. Because the indi¤erence curve of the low type is steeper than the fair price, a reduction of the coverage on the low types with o¤setting reduction of the premium to maintain this type indi¤erent, will produce a …rst-order reduction in pro…ts. If the proportion of low type is high enough the pooling equilibrium is stable.
Comparison with competition
In the competitive insurance market, contracts make zero pro…t. Following Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) there exists no pooling equilibrium. This precludes any cross-subsidization between types as in the monopoly case. In fact, the competitive equilibrium can be represented by the following programme in which the surplus for each type is maximized subject to the IC and IR constraints plus the zero-pro…t conditions on each contract, that is:
subject to (5) ,(6), (7), (8) and
A separating equilibrium exists depending on the distribution of types. In the separating equilibrium, zero-pro…t conditions (12) and (13) imply fair price on each contract, so that the participation constraints (5) and (6) are not binding and only the Incentive Compatibility constraint (8) is binding,
where by (12) and (13) = ( ) = ( ) Using the standard no-distortion-at-the-top argument = 1, and substituting back this expression and the fair prices into the incentive constraint gives the equilibrium coverage rate for the low type,
The low-type weakly prefers this separating contract to the pooling contract (with full insurance) if
Substituting for ( ), we get
It is immediately veri…ed that welfare is higher with competition when this condition is satis…ed. High-risk individuals obtain full coverage at fair price (which is the full information allocation) and low-risk individuals obtain partial coverage, whereas under monopoly the low-risk individuals are not able to buy insurance. If this condition does not hold, the competitive market unravels and the monopoly dominates with the low-risk individuals being now able to buy full insurance. Thus we have the following proposition, Proposition 3 There exists p < 1 (with p > p ) such that, for p p the surplus is higher under competition for p > p the surplus is lower under competition. Figure 2 depicts the competition and the monopoly surplus relative to the second-best allocation.
The bottom line is that, with two-type, monopoly insurance can dominate competition only if insurance market unravels under competition (i.e. p > p ). In this case monopoly can in fact provide full insurance to both types. When the proportion of low type is su¢ ciently small, p < p , it pays the monopolist to exclude the low-risk individuals, and competition dominates by supplying insurance to both low-risk and high-risk individuals (although di¤erent contracts). Before proceeding to the analysis of the continuum case, we ask why the threshold p is the same with competition and the monopoly. As argued earlier, with monopoly the threshold p = p equates the expected revenue gain of increasing coverage to the low-risk individuals by ( ); that is p ( ) against the expected revenue loss on the high-risk individuals to keep the schedule incentive compatible, which by linearity is just equal to the di¤erence in the slopes of the indi¤er-ence curves of the two types times the change in the the coverage rate: (1 p) (1 + ) ( ). With competition the zero-pro…t condition must hold and the threshold for a separating equilibrium p = p is such that the low-risk individuals are indi¤erent between the separating contract with partial coverage and a zero-pro…t pooling contract with full coverage. From the indi¤erence condition, all the rent that the low-risk-individuals make with the increased coverage of the pooling contract must be fully extracted, so the revenue gain is p ( ) which, in order to maintain zero-pro…t, has to be equal to the revenue loss on the high-risk individuals (1 p) (1 + ) ( ). Thus the condition is the same as for the monopoly.
Continuum case

Monopoly
In this section we study the equilibrium outcome of monopoly insurance with a continuum of risks. The optimization problem of the monopolist is:
where (14) is the set of participation constraints and (15) denotes the set of incentive constraints. Analyzing the set (14) we can see that V ( ( ); ( ); ) V (0; 0; ) must be binding, for otherwise it would be possible to increase ( ) 8 > . This is the classical monopoly result of full rent extraction at the bottom. 11 As a result all the agents with > are left with information rent, and so their participation constraints are not binding.
In the following Proposition the monopolist outcome is summarized.
Proposition 4
In a monopoly insurance market with a continuum of risk, there exists 
Proof. see Appendix
Therefore the solution is characterized by a (pooling) contract that o¤ers full coverage to all with a premium extracting all the surplus from type and no insurance to all < . The equilibrium payo¤ of type under monopoly is:
where the LHS is the revenue loss of an increase in due to the nonparticipation of pivotal type and the RHS is the revenue gain from charging a higher price on all agents above the pivotal type .
Comparison with competition
It is well known that with a continuum of types a competitive equilibrium may fail to exist. In fact Riley (2001) showed the general non-existence of the Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium. This existence problem can be circumvented by resorting to the reactive equilibrium concept introduced by Riley (1979) and developed further by Engers and Fernandez (1987) . A reactive equilibrium is a set of o¤ers such that there exists no pro…table deviation by any …rm given that other …rms can optimally react to this deviation by o¤ering new contracts. Engers and Fernandez (1987) provide general conditions, for which the Pareto-dominant full-separating zero-pro…t set of contracts is the unique reactive equilibrium outcome. It turns out that those conditions hold true in our framework. 12 The key element is that …rms are deterred to deviate from the full separating equilibrium by the belief that other …rms will react to "skim the cream" and make such initial deviation unpro…table.
The Pareto-dominant fully separating zero-pro…t competitive equilibrium solves So, while in the monopoly everyone above gets full insurance, with competition only the highest-risk individuals obtain full coverage and all the other individuals with lower risk obtain partial coverage. On the other hand everyone below gets no insurance with monopoly, while they are provided at least with partial coverage in the competitive case. An interesting di¤erence is that the distribution of risk does not in ‡uence the screening equilibrium in the competitive setting, while it in ‡uences the equilibrium allocation in a monopoly; this feature, as we will see shortly, is essential in the comparison of the outcomes. Turning to competitive prices, each type is charged the fair premium
The payo¤ of type under competition is:
The payo¤ of type under monopoly is:
De…ne the payo¤ di¤erence between competition and monopoly equilibrium:
so when it is not obvious that individuals prefer competition to monopoly. To see if individuals on average can be better o¤ with monopoly, we integrate the payo¤ di¤erence over the whole range of types to obtain the following expression (see Appendix):
Including the monopolist pro…t, we can compare the outcomes under competition and monopoly in terms of total surplus (see Appendix):
where the …rst part measures the bene…t of competition in terms of better insurance to those who cannot buy insurance in a monopoly ( < ); and the second part measures the cost of competition in providing only partial insurance to those who can get full insurance in a monopoly ( ). The net balance of the two e¤ects depends on the size of the threshold :
We can easily derive for a uniform distribution.
by de…nition = solves Figure 4 the e¤ect of a change in distribution is depicted: the left panel shows a negatively skewed Beta distribution, while the right panel shows a positively skewed Beta distribution. While the coverage rate under competition is the same, the level of in the left panel is lower than in the right panel. 
Numerical simulation
In this section we perform some numerical simulations using Beta distribution of risks with non-decreasing hazard rate. We have seen that the risk distribution a¤ects the monopoly outcome by changing the critical level , while it does not a¤ect the competition equilibrium outcome. (a; b) , given the parameters = 0:1, = 0:3, = 0:7.
The e¤ect of changing the distribution on the equilibrium monopoly coverage rate is illustrated in Table 1 . In this table a Beta distribution (a; b) is used to show that the coverage rate increases with the concentration of the distribution (i.e., simultaneous increase in a and b). Moreover, the more positively skewed is the distribution (i.e.,higher a b > 0) the higher is the coverage rate.
The relative performance of competition and monopoly is shown in the following tables. They show the total surplus realized in the competitive and monopoly equilibria as a percentage of the total surplus under full information. Fixing the degree of risk aversion and the spread of risks we can compare competition and monopoly for di¤erent Beta distributions. The key result is that except for the uniform distribution (a = b = 1) and distributions for which the highest risk is the mode (b = 1), the monopoly realizes a higher fraction of the gains from trade.
Comparing Tables 2 and 3 illustrates the e¤ect of an increase in risk aversion. The surplus increases for both competition and monopoly (due to larger demand for insurance), but the monopoly still signi…cantly outperforms competition.
Comparing Table 3 and 4 we see the e¤ect of a reduction in the spread of risks [ ; ]. The e¤ect is once again an increase in the surplus of both competition and monopoly without changing the relative performance. Table 4 : Surplus under monopoly and competition as a percentage of the First Best surplus for various distributions over risk Beta(a; b), given the parameters = 0: 3, = 0:3, = 0:5.
Conclusions
There is recent work on the (asymptotic) e¢ ciency of competition based on the idea that asymmetry in agent's information is relatively unimportant in a large economy (obtained by a replication process) because any single agent has only a small amount of information not known by the other agents. This is the notion of informational smallness. As Gul and Postlewaite noted this result holds in private value information problems in which agents have private information that is of direct relevance only to themselves (i.e. the agents' utility functions depend only on their own type). This is obviously not the case for the insurance problem (and for the adverse selection problem in general). Indeed in our insurance problem with a continuum of types it might seem that each agent is informationally small and yet the market outcome is very far from the full information outcome. The reason is that each agent remains informationally large in this context. Using the benchmark model of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) , we contrast the competitive equilibrium outcome with the monopoly equilibrium outcome à la Stiglitz (1977) and we compare their relative ef…ciency. The main change is that we adopt the dual theory of risk so that the comparison comes out neatly. The dual theory has the property that utility is linear in income, and risk aversion is expressed entirely by a transformation of probabilities in which bad outcomes are given relatively higher weights and good outcomes are given relatively lower weights.
Our main …nding is that competition is bad and that the monopoly outcome in general is more e¢ cient than the competitive outcome (according to our expected e¢ ciency criterion de…ned as the fraction of the total surplus that is realized by the market). The reason why monopoly performs better than competition is that the monopolists can exploit its market power to relax the incentive constrains. This is one of many examples of the interplay between market imperfections. The economy, in e¤ect has to trade o¤ between two di¤erent imperfections: imperfections of information or imperfections of competition, with no particular reason that these imperfections will be balanced optimally.
We expect our result about the ine¢ ciency of competition in insurance markets with adverse selection to carry over on other markets with adverse selection like the capital market or the job market. We also plan to extend this analysis to screening in the higher education market.
There is a …nal remark about the use of the dual theory of risk. With this speci…cation there is no income e¤ect on the demand of insurance. In contrast, the expected utility approach will raise the demand for insurance in the monopoly market relative to the competitive market if the absolute risk aversion is decreasing. This is because monopoly price is higher than competitive price which reduces income and thus raises the marginal willingness to pay for insurance. It is then expected that moving to the expect utility will further increase the amount of insurance in the monopoly market relative to the competitive market, thereby reinforcing our conclusion about the ine¢ ciency of competition.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
The optimization program is a linear programme with 3 variables and 7 constraints (when accounting for the 3 nonnegativity constraints). In this problem there cannot be a solution with variables equal to zero. 13 So excluding the nonnegativity constraints, the search of the solution amounts to the search of the extreme points among the remaining 4 constraints. From linear programming we know that when the nonnegativity constraints are not binding any basic feasible solution implies that the number of binding constraints must be equal to the total number of variables.
14 So we must have a solution with three binding constraints. There are only two possibilities. Either ( ) < 1 and we have a separating outcome or ( ) = 1 and we have a pooling outcome. De…ne p = < 1. When p < p , we have a separating outcome with ( ) < 1: In this case the constraints (9), (10) and (11) Substituting in (9) the solution is
Total welfare in the separating case is:
When p p we have a pooling outcome with ( ) = 1.
13 cannot be zero because otherwise (9) would be violated. If ( ) was equal to zero, so should be ( ) for the constraint (10) . Moreover either (9) or (11) should be not binding: so it were always possible to increase ( ) and to change ( ) and so that the constraints are respected and total welfare is increased. For example, if (11) is binding (9) is not and it is possible to reduce increasing ( ) and ( ) without violating the constraints. If (9) is binding (11) is not and it is possible to increase ( ) with a fair premium ( ) without violating the constraints.
14 See Chiang (1984).
Either (10) and (11) are binding, and the solution is :
where 0 for p p ;
or (9) and (11) are binding, and the solution is
Moreover, any convex combination of the two pooling solutions is also a solution, di¤ering only in the premium charged and the division of the surplus. So any premium 
The solution is
In the case of pooling, by the binding constraint (5), the premium is ( ) = = (1 + ) . In the case of separating outcome, only the high type gets full insurance = 1 at its reservation price = (1 + ) . It is then easily checked that p > p which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4. Because the unique binding IR constraint is for the lowest type: 
Moreover, the necessary LIC is also su¢ cient condition when the utility function V ( (^ ); (^ ); ) satis…es the increasing di¤erences property, where the second equality follows from (19) . Using these results we can rewrite the maximization programme of the monopolist as follows: Ignoring for the moment the monotonicity constraint that will be checked later, we can rewrite the objective function after substituting the constraint in it. From the de…nition of the value function 
This expression for the insurance premium captures the incentive and participation constraints. Plugging this premium in the objective function we get the reduced problem: In order to carry out the e¢ ciency comparison we de…ne the aggregate di¤erence in consumer and producer surplus in the competitive and monopoly cases :
